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The history of the twentieth century is'largely the history of increasing
bureaucratization. Almost every phase of American life has come to be
dominated by large-scale, complex organizations-the corporation, the la-
bor union, the university, the public hospital, and even our national politi-
cal agencies. The national executive does not simply consist of the Presi-
dent and a small group of trusted advisers, but is instead composed of a
vast, sprawling conglomerate of administrative agencies, which are staffed
by more than three million (civilian) employees.1 We have come to accept
this and often refer to the executive branch as "The Bureaucracy, ' 2 but a
similar development has occurred within the legislature. In addition to
some 500 senators and representatives, Congress now consists of about
40,000 employees, more than 300 committees and subcommittees, and 8
internal agencies (like the General Accounting Office and the Congres-
sional Budget Office).8 Against this background, an account of the judici-
ary, such as Cardozo's,' that focuses exclusively on the agony of a lonely,
isolated judge seems somewhat dated. Today the judiciary must be seen as
a large-scale, complex organization.
My claim is not that the bureaucratic character of the modern judiciary
is a legacy of the New Deal, the ostensible subject of this symposium. The
interaction between the judiciary and the distinctive forms of government
power legitimated by the New Deal may have contributed to and indeed
exacerbated the bureaucratization of the judiciary;5 but I do not believe
that this particular interaction is the basic cause of the phenomenon. I
attribute it instead to the growing size and complexity of American soci-
ety. The judiciary should be seen as a coordinate source of government
t Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Public Law, Yale Law School. This essay began as a talk to
the Sixth Circuit Judicial Conference held in Asheville, North Carolina, July 15-18, 1982, and also
benefited from presentations at Columbia University and Universidad de Puerto Rico.
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1981, at 268
(1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
2. See, e.g., R.D. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: A THEORY OF INFLUENCE (1979);
W. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
3. See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS SERV., GSA, THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1981/82, at 33-34, 48-67 (1981); 1981 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
supra note 1, at 268. See generally U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, 1983-1984 OFFICIAL CONGRES-
SIONAL DIRECTORY, 98TH CONGRESS 267-382 (1983) (listing Senate and House Committees); 1982
CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY (C. Brownson ed. 1982) (listing various staffs).
4. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
5. Fiss, Two Models of Adjudication, in HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS? (R.
Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1985) (forthcoming).
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Bureaucratization of the Judiciary
power-an integral part of the state-subject to the same forces that have
shaped the executive and legislative branches. The bureaucratization of
the judiciary does not stem from the bureaucratization of the political
agencies of the state, or from the interaction of the judiciary with them; it
is instead a parallel development caused by the same forces-not the New
Deal, not the advent of the administrative or activist state, but the very
character of modern life itself.
From this perspective, this- essay can be seen as a case study of the
bureaucratization of governmental power (and as such, a companion to
Professor Simon's essay).6 It is, however, a case study with a special twist
because in the context of the judiciary, bureaucratization poses a unique
challenge to the legitimacy of governmental power. The legislative and
executive branches derive their legitimacy from their responsiveness to
popular will, and bureaucratization acts as a screen that impairs the re-
sponsiveness of officials within these branches. With the judiciary, how-
ever, the impact of bureaucratization is felt in another domain altogether:
Bureaucratization tends to corrode the individualistic processes that are
the source of judicial legitimacy.
The foundation of judicial power is process. Judges are entrusted with
power because of their special competence to interpret public values em-
bodied in authoritative texts, and this competence is derived from the pro-
cess that has long characterized the judiciary and that limits the exercise
of its power. One aspect of that process is independence. Judicial indepen-
dence is not threatened by bureaucratization, and, indeed, today the inde-
pendence of the judiciary from the political branches might depend on its
capacity to develop the organizational resources usually associated with a
bureaucracy. But a second aspect of the legitimating process of the judici-
ary is threatened. I am referring to the obligation of a judge to engage in a
special dialogue-to listen to all grievances, hear from all the interests
affected, and give reasons for his decisions. By signing his name to a judg-
ment or opinion, the judge assures the parties that he has thoroughly par-
ticipated in that process and assumes individual responsiblity for the de-
cision. We accept the judicial power on these terms, and yet bureau-
cratization raises the spectre that the judge's signature is but a sham and
that the judge is exercising power without genuinely engaging in the dia-
logue from which his authority flows.
6. See Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198
(1983).
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I.
Not all organizational relationships are bureaucratic. The allocation of
power to both state and federal courts creates a complex set of organiza-
tional relationships among the judges of the two political systems, but I
regard these relationships more as coordinate than bureaucratic.7 Simi-
larly, I do not regard as bureaucratic the organizational relationships that
arise from the fact that appellate courts today generally act through
groups of judges. Interactions among the members of each group may cre-
ate relationships that threaten the integrity of the judicial process, when,
for example, compromises must be made to secure a majority, but I regard
these relationships as more collegial or committee-like than bureaucratic.8
For me, the feature that distinguishes bureaucracy from these other or-
ganizational relationships is hierarchy: The bureaucratic relationship is
vertical rather than horizontal.
"Bureaucracy" is a term often used with pejorative connotations, be-
cause of the pathologies or dysfunctions connected with complex organiza-
tions, but I intend it more descriptively. I will use the term "bureaucracy"
to refer to a complex organization with three features: (1) a multitude of
actors; (2) a division of functions or responsibilities among them; and (3) a
reliance upon a hierarchy as the central device to coordinate their activi-
ties. In stressing the hierarchical element, I do not mean to claim that
hierarchy is the only coordinating device, for in bureaucracies of profes-
sionals, like the judiciary, hierarchy is often supplemented by a common
culture-a set of shared norms and ideals. But this qualification does not
destroy the central importance of hierarchy to the organization and the
usefulness of the concept in analyzing a series of organizational relation-
ships that characterize the modern judiciary.
I focus on the federal judiciary because it is often thought to be the
fullest embodiment of the judicial ideal and also because it is considered
the least bureaucratic of all our judicial systems. In this system, three
hierarchical relationships can be identified: judge-judge, judge-staff, and
what I shall call "judge-subjudge." Of all the hierarchical relationships,
the first-the relationship between judges on different levels of the judicial
system-is the weakest and, as is often true in bureaucratic organizations,
those at the bottom of the hierarchy have considerably more power than
the organizational chart indicates.' There is a gap between formal power
7. For a discussion of federalism as a coordinate system, see Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Fed-
eralism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional
Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981).
8. For a discussion of the impact of committee-like relationships on the judicial process, see Fiss,
Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977).
9. See M. CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON 145-74 (1964) (identifying dynamics
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and real power. This gap stems in part from the fact that the Supreme
Court lacks the time, resources, and information needed to supervise the
lower courts effectively. The Supreme Court fully considers around 150
cases a year while the federal courts of appeals alone produce 10,000
judgments a year.10 Nor can the courts of appeals fill the supervisory void
left by the Supreme Court. They are not organized to exercise managerial
duties. Each court of appeals consists of a multitude of judges, who do not
speak with one voice, and the control of each court is confined to a geo-
graphical region of the country and does not extend as broadly as federal
law must-to the entire nation.
The hierarchy among judges is further weakened by the absence of any
sanctioning system." Contrary to the practice in most bureaucracies, those
higher up in the judicial hierarchy have no authority over the appoint-
ment, removal, promotion, or pay of those below. Sometimes the especially
obedient are rewarded by compliments in appellate opinions; sometimes
the especially recalcitrant are publicly reprimanded; and sometimes judges
high in the hierarchy will be consulted when a judge below seeks to move
up. For the most part, however, the hierarchical control over judges is
exercised through review of the work product of those below. And al-
though the conscientious do not take such review lightly, it must be seen
as a rather weak and indirect instrument of control. In 1980, Congress
gave the judicial councils of the circuits power to investigate complaints
against lower judges, but the sanctions stop short of removal."2 The stat-
ute surrounds the judge accused of misbehavior with elaborate procedural
protections, nearly equivalent to those available in a criminal prosecution,
and specifically provides that a complaint may be dismissed if it relates to
the merits of a decision. In many respects, the new legislation stands as a
symbol of the weakness of the controls of one judge over another.
The second hierarchical relationship is that between a judge and his
staff. Some of that staff-for example, the clerk of the court, the bailiff,
and the judge's secretary-generally do not participate in the decisional
process, and for the purposes of examining how bureaucratization affects
leading to divergence of real and formal power).
10. 1981 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 185.
11. See Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J.
480, 493-95 (1975) (only in "narrow area of binding lower courts . . . on remand" is there real
control of lower court behavior).
12. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, § 3, 28
U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(B) (1982) provides a partial catalogue of "appropriate" sanctions: (1) certifying
the disability of a judge; (2) requesting that a judge voluntarily retire; (3) ordering temporarily that
no new cases be assigned to a judge; and (4) reprimanding a judge, either publicly or privately. In
addition, the judicial council may refer any complaint to the Judicial Conference of the United States,
which may, if it determines that impeachment may he warranted, refer the matter to the House of
Representatives. Id. § 372(c)(7).
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the integrity of that process, they can be safely ignored. Law clerks, how-
ever, cannot be ignored.1" One must begin an analysis of their role by
making a distinction between two types of law clerks: "elbow clerks," who
are chosen by and work under the direct supervision of a particular judge,
and "staff attorneys," who are not assigned to any particular judge but
belong to what has become known as the "central legal staff." The staff
attorneys seem to be confined to the courts of appeals. 4
The role of staff in the decisional process is not publicly or formally
defined, and in any event, varies from judge to judge and from court to
court. Elbow clerks may write memoranda recommending how cases
should be decided (referred to as "bench memoranda"), discuss cases with
the judge, research issues that are not fully briefed, and draft opinions.
Staff attorneys might do the same, but their primary function is to screen
cases for appellate courts. A staff attorney usually prepares a memoran-
dum for a panel of judges recommending whether a case should be dis-
posed of summarily through issuance of a judgment order, rather than
being fully argued and decided with a full opinion.
The third hierarchical relationship in the federal system is that between
judges and certain auxiliary personnel such as magistrates, bankruptcy
judges, and special masters, all of whom I call (borrowing a term from
Geoffrey Aronow"5) "subjudges." Subjudges participate in the decisional
process, but fall somewhere between law clerks and judges in terms of
their power. In contrast to law clerks, subjudges are formally and publicly
entrusted with some measure of decisional power, and yet are distin-
guished from judges because of special restrictions on their power. The
scope of their jurisdiction is especially limited (e.g., bankruptcy, pretrial
discovery, habeas corpus petitions, or the trial of petty crimes). Their de-
cisions are subject to review by a judge under more stringent standards
than when one judge is reviewing the work of another judge. Subjudges
serve for limited terms and are subject to the hierarchical con-
trols-appointment and dismissal-that are not exercised by one judge
over another. As a consequence, the hierarchy between judges and sub-
13. Nor have they been. See J. OAKLEY & R. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL PRO-
CESS: PERCEPTIONS OF THE QUALITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW CLERKS IN AMERICAN COURTS
(1980) (empirical study of clerks in federal and California courts). A good deal of the recent public
interest in law clerks stems from B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
14. On the role of staff attorneys, see Ubell, Report on Central Staff Attorneys' Offices in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 87 F.R.D. 253 (1980). Some circuit courts also have "settlement
counsel" who try to facilitate, encourage, and maybe even pressure the parties into settlement. Some-
times persons called "screening clerks" or "pro se clerks" perform the function of staff attorneys. The
Supreme Court does not formally have staff attorneys, but a comparable institution has evolved
through the establishment of a pool of law clerks to screen certiorari petitions. Apparently six justices
participate in this arrangement.
15. Aronow, The Special Master in School Desegregation Cases: The Evolution of Roles in the
Reformation of Public Institutions Through Litigation, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 739, 742 (1980).
1446
Vol. 92: 1442, 1983
HeinOnline -- 92 Yale L.J. 1446 1982-1983
Bureaucratization of the Judiciary
judges, like that between judge and staff, is stronger than the hierarchy
among judges.
Putting together these three hierarchical relationships-judge-judge,
judge-staff, and judge-subjudge-one can discern the familiar bureaucratic
structure: a pyramid. The federal judicial system consists of three tiers of
courts-the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals, and the district courts.
Within each of these tiers is a shadow consisting of the law clerks or staff.
The bottom tier has a second shadow, consisting of the subjudges, who are
primarily used and supervised by the district judges. As a purely formal
matter, this bureaucratic structure is not new. Almost every element of it
can be traced back to the turn of the century, when Congress created the
circuit courts of appeals and transformed the federal judicial system from
a two-tiered to a three-tiered system.16 What is new, and what has pro-
voked the bureaucratization debate of recent years, is not the formal struc-
ture itself, but rather its internal density-the proliferation of participants
within the structure.
In 1900, there were just over 100 federal judges-9 at the Supreme
Court, 24 circuit judges, and 77 district judges. 17 Today there are more
than 850.18 In 1900, there were only 9 "stenographic clerks"-one for
each justice.19 The modern law clerk can be seen to have evolved from
that position, but today the role of the clerk has become more important in
the decisional process and the number of law clerks has greatly increased.
There are approximately 1600 elbow clerks;20 some judges have two,
others three, and some four. The Chief Justice has five. The staff attorney
is also new. Today there are 112 such clerks,2" and it seems likely that
their number will grow now that the position has been institutionalized
and the need for screening cases has become more important.
Within recent years, a great deal of attention has focused on special
masters.22 This is probably due to the hotly contested and protracted na-
16. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
17. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 OFFICIAL REGISTER OF THE UNITED STATES 1275-1316
(1901).
18. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS: 1982, at 3
(1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 U.S. COURTS REPORT]. This figure includes 217 judges on senior
status. The breakdown of authorized federal judgeships (as opposed to the number of judges) is as
follows: Supreme Court (9), Courts of Appeals (132), District Courts (515). In addition, 16 new
judgeships for specialized appellate courts have been authorized by the Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982, § 105(a), 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1982).
19. See Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L.
REV. 299, 301-03 (1961).
20. 1982 U.S. COURTS REPORT, supra note 18, at 34.
21. Id.
22. See Aronow, supra note 15; Berger, Away From the Court House and Into the Field: The
Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM1. L. REV. 707 (1978); Harris, The Title VII Administrator:
A Case Study in Judicial Flexibility, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 53 (1974); Kirp & Babcock, Judge and
Company: Court-Appointed Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L.
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ture of the cases in which they are involved (e.g., school desegregation)
rather than their number; in fact, their closest historical counterparts-the
receivers of the railroad reorganizations at the turn of the century-were
fairly numerous.2" Attention has also focused on the subjudges used in the
bankruptcy system, who for most of the twentieth century have been
known as referees but are today called judges, even though they do not
enjoy the full protection of Article III. In 1982, the Supreme Court de-
clared unconstitutional the 1978 statute that effectuated this change of ti-
tle and that also entrusted these officials with what the Court considered
Article III duties.2 ' Congress now has the choice, over which it has been
especially divided, of elevating the bankruptcy judges to full judicial sta-
tus, with life tenure and protection against pay reduction, or limiting their
powers and duties.2 5
It seems to me, however, that the most significant subjudges are neither
the special masters nor the bankruptcy judges, but the magistrates. They
are not specialists but, in background and work, generalists much like the
federal district judges. Magistrates handle matters as varied as habeas pe-
titions and social security claims; they manage pretrial discovery, adjudi-
cate petty crimes and, with the consent of the parties, can try all matter of
civil cases. The present scheme contemplates close to 500 magistrates,
which makes them almost as numerous as district judges (though almost
half now serve on a part-time basis).2" The commissioners, whom the
magistrates succeeded, were also quite numerous (in 1900 they numbered
over 1,10027), but this statistic obscures important distinctions. The con-
temporary magistrate is a lawyer and charged with more significant deci-
sional responsibility than were the commissioners; and the magistrates'
role will probably increase as Congress entrusts them with more responsi-
bility and as the Supreme Court continues to remove the constitutional
objections to this legislative program.28 It is likely that, in time, the elabo-
REv. 313 (1981); Starr, Accommodation and Accountability: A Strategy for Judicial Enforcement of
'Institutional Reform Decrees, 32 ALA. L. REV. 399 (1981); Comment, Equitable Remedies: An
Analysis of Judicial Utilization of Neoreceiverships to Implement Large Scale Institutional Change,
1976 WIS. L. REV. 1161; Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062 (1979).
23. See Martin, Railroads and the Equity Receivership: An Essay on Institutional Change, 34 J.
ECON. HIsT. 685, 688 (1974).
24. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
25. For the various proposals, see S. REP. NO. 55, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-97 (1983); H.R. REP.
NO. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-110 (1983).
26. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE SYSTEM: A RE,
PORT TO THE CONGRESS 23 (1981) (489 magistrate positions-219 full-time, 270 part-time-are au-
thorized as of October 1, 1981).
27. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 17, at 1275-1316.
28. The magistrate system was first established in 1968, and over the next decade or so Congress
intervened twice-once in 1976 and again in 1979-to strengthen the system and enlarge the duties of
magistrates. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 26, at 1-8. For a critical
assessment of this trend, see Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of
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ration of the magistrate system will create a permanent corps of subjudges
and that the second shadow on the bottom level of the pyramid will be-
come a fourth, but somewhat irregular, tier of the federal system.
II.
With the growth of American society, it seems inevitable that the num-
ber of judges will increase. Nothing would be more absurd than to assume
that the number of judges in 1900 would be sufficient to do justice in
1980. The claims of injustice have grown. Moreover, the social reality
that must today be analyzed, and possibly reformed, by a judiciary deter-
mined to do justice is infinitely more complex, as are the sources of deci-
sion (e.g., precedents, statutes, and law review articles). It thus seems in-
evitable, and probably desirable, for the judiciary to turn to staff and
other auxiliary personnel for help in discharging its duties. The number
of personnel who participate in any judicial decision will therefore multi-
ply, as will the total number of judges. Hierarchical relationships will
then be created to coordinate the work of all these people and the judicial
system will become bureaucratized.
To coordinate the work of all the judges, hierarchy is required by the
sheer numbers involved and by certain political and legal impera-
tives-the need for uniform national norms and for consistent application
of these norms. The professional culture judges share will facilitate coor-
dination, and may indeed be necessary to support and temper the hierar-
chical relationships, but this common culture is not itself sufficient. Hier-
archy is also necessary. On the other hand, the hierarchical relationships
between each judge and his staff and between judge and subjudge are not
attributable to size. Staff and subjudges are distributed to individual
judges and to courts throughout the nation, and thus the number of per-
sons whose work must be coordinated is quite limited. The work of a
judge and his staff could conceivably proceed on a collegial or non-
hierarchical basis. But there is a need for hierarchy between a judge and
his staff, and also between a judge and the subjudges assigned to him, and
it arises not from size but from inequalities inherent in the constitutional
distribution of power: The power to adjudicate is given to judges, not to
their staff or to subjudges.
From this perspective, therefore, the issue is not whether we have a
bureaucracy, for bureaucratization, as I have defined the term, seems in-
evitable and perhaps desirable. The bureaucratization of the judiciary,
like the bureaucratization of the world, cannot be avoided. The issue is
Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023 (1979) (arguing that trial by magistrate
impermissibly delegates Article III power).
1449
HeinOnline -- 92 Yale L.J. 1449 1982-1983
The Yale Law Journal
instead a narrower one, namely, whether bureaucratic organizations pro-
duce pathologies or dysfunctions that threaten the foundations of the judi-
cial process. If they do, and if we can identify those pathologies, we may
be able to devise institutional arrangements that might contain or at least
alleviate the dangers to the judicial process presented by a development
that seems inescapable.
A.
There is a strong tradition in sociology, associated with the work of
Max Weber, that identifies bureaucracy with rule-governed behavior: A
Weberian bureaucrat is an official governed by a rule that prohibits him
from taking into account individual circumstances. 29 According to this tra-
dition, the bureaucratic pathology is excessively rigid behavior, which in
turn stems from the obligation of the bureaucrat to adhere to the general
rules that define the powers and duties of his office.
There is a question in my mind as to the validity of the Weberian
emphasis on rules in any bureaucracy-it ignores the fact that general
rules are only one type of hierarchical control 3 -but, at the very least, it
seems that the Weberian emphasis has little import for the judicial bu-
reaucracy. Rigidity is not one of its sins. Weber himself sensed this point.
He did identify the bureaucratic mentality-thinking according to
rules-with the legal mentality, and thus often described bureaucratic au-
thority as a rational-legal authority; but he specifically acknowledged that
the legal method of England and America (as opposed to that of the Con-
tinent) was not bureaucratic. Weber described Anglo-American adjudica-
tion as "empirical justice": "[F]ormal judgments are rendered, though not
by subsumption under rational concepts, but by drawing on 'analogies'
and by depending upon and interpreting concrete 'precedents.' ",31 Weber
wrote these words in the early part of the twentieth century, but none of
the developments in the intervening years has made his observation less
apt.
One part of the judicial bureaucracy does seem to fit the Weberian
model-the office of the clerk of the court. The clerk has general rules
governing such matters as when briefs should be filed and on what size
paper, and presumably he enforces these rules with some regularity. Such
behavior no doubt angers many litigators, but there is no evidence (other
29. M. WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 220-21 (H.
Gerth & C. Mills eds. 1946). For a new interpretation of Weber's sociology of law, see A. KRONMAN,
MAX WEBER (1983).
30. See Rudolph & Rudolph, Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administra-
tion: A Revisionist Intepretation of Weber on Bureaucracy, 31 WORLD POL. 195, 196-200 (1979).
31. M. WEBER, supra note 29, at 216.
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than the occasional anecdote) suggesting that it is excessive, and in any
event, those complaining about the bureaucratization of the judiciary are
rarely concerned with the behavior of the clerks of the court. 2 The charge
of bureaucratization is instead levelled at those who decide cases (the
judges) and at those who participate in the decisional process (law clerks
and subjudges). With respect to them, the Weberian emphasis on rigidity
seems wholly inapposite.
To begin with, it must be remembered that general rules play an im-
portant and wholly legitimate role in any legal system. Adherence to rules
is required by the very idea of the rule of law and by the maxim that
insists upon a "government of laws and not of men." The charge must
therefore be that the decisional process manifests excessive rule-bound be-
havior or excessive rigidity. No one has a standard for determining when
adherence to general rules is excessive, but there are several reasons for
believing that this condition does not now exist in the judicial bureaucracy
and that it will not arise in the immediate future. There is all the differ-
ence in the world between the Prussian civil service and the federal judici-
ary, even in its present form.
The smaller the number of subordinates for each supervising official,
the less the need to rely on general rules as a mechanism of controlling
subordinates; and with respect to the judge-staff and judge-subjudge rela-
tionships, this number is relatively small. Recent years have seen a
proliferation of staff, but the span of control for each supervising official
(the judge) has nevertheless remained limited. Indeed, it is minuscule
compared to that found in the bureaucratic organizations at the center of
Weber's analysis. With respect to elbow clerks, a judge must at most su-
pervise the work of four people, or, in the case of the Chief Justice, five.
The same narrow span of control characterizes the relation between judge
and subjudge. Special masters are usually appointed for a particular case,
and the judge is not likely to use more than one. The total number of
magistrates is significant, and likely to grow, but they are distributed
throughout the United States, according to judicial districts, and as a con-
sequence the span of control is also limited. Even in the busiest district,
the Southern District of New York, eight magistrates are supervised by
twenty-five district judges.33 When the span of control is so narrow,
judges are likely to avoid general rules and stress particularized methods
of control, such as individual review of the official's work product.
The span of control in the judge-judge relationship has increased in
32. Some have worried about clerks of the court exercising decisional power, as for example, in
the Fourth Circuit, where the clerk of the court is officially delegated the authority to rule on motions
to recall the court's mandate.
33. Compiled from UNITED STATES COURT DIRECTORY (1982).
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recent years to the point where only nine justices supervise roughly two
hundred circuit judges, who in turn supervise more than six hundred dis-
trict judges."' This has resulted in increased reliance on general rules, as
is evidenced by the proliferation of uniform procedural rules (e.g., Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence). But
there are three factors that operate to offset the drive toward rigidity that
might otherwise arise from the increased use of general rules. One is the
ideological commitment to "empirical justice," which shapes the content of
the general rules and leaves them rather open-ended. Another is the role
of lawyers, who are given considerable power to shape and control judicial
proceedings and constitute the group from which judges are selected.
Lawyers are usually commissioned by the specific and devoted to it, and
they are likely to carry their perspective onto the bench. A third factor is
the relative autonomy of the judges on the lower tiers of the pyramid.
Although lower judges are as a formal matter bound by general rules, the
hierarchy between judges is in fact so weak that they can often deviate
from general rules with little fear of censure. Admittedly, judges exert
stronger control over staff and subjudges than they do over other judges,
but, as I pointed out earlier, the narrow span of control in these other
relationships reduces the need for general rules. It is also true that judges
are unlikely to expect their subordinates (staff and subjudges) to behave
"bureaucratically" in the sense that Weber used the term. Judges are
likely to structure their expectations in terms of their own self-image, and
that consists of a complicated blend of the specific and the general.
B.
For these reasons, I believe that the Weberian model does not fit the
American judiciary. Excessive rigidity is not the danger. Given the hold of
Max Weber on the sociological imagination and even on everyday usage
(where the descriptive usage collapses into the accusatory, and bureau-
cratic dysfunction is often thought of as rigidity), one might be tempted to
dismiss the charge of bureaucratization altogether. But that would be a
mistake. There is another intellectual tradition concerned with bureaucra-
tization that has great relevance for the judiciary. It consists of the work
of Hannah Arendt, who identifies the pathology of bureaucratization in
terms of its impact on the moral character of those who act within the
bureaucratic structure. For Arendt, bureaucracy is not so much Weber's
Rule by Rules as it is Rule by Nobody. The Arendtian pathology can
arise even when the scale of bureaucracy is small and hierarchy is weak.
34. See 1982 U.S. COURTS REPORT, supra note 18, at 3.
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Indeed, as we will see, weak hierarchy often exacerbates the corrosive ef-
fect of organizational complexity on individual responsibility.
Arendt's most sustained analysis of bureaucracy appears in her account
of Eichmann, though it there appears only indirectly, largely to be in-
ferred by the reader from her historical narrative.35 Her method is to tell
a story, in this instance about an operative within the Nazi organization
charged with the task of transporting the Jews as part of a deportation
program and later as part of the Final Solution. In Eichmann, Arendt
sees the "banality of evil." By this Arendt does not mean that Eichmann
was crass or ordinary, in the way that an uneducated or unsophisticated
person might be (though Eichmann was that too), but rather that he was
not motivated by some special hatred toward the Jews. He was not de-
monic but thoughtless. He did not fully consider (through the "soundless
dialogue . . . between me and myself"3" that, for Arendt, constitutes
thinking) what he was doing. As she put it, in what I regard as the cru-
cial sentence of the book, "He merely . . . never realized what he was
doing."'3
7
There is, of course, a question (of no concern to me here) as to the
accuracy of this characterization of Eichmann. There is the further and
more important question as to the explanation of this thoughtless-
ness-not what made Eichmann the person he was, which may be discov-
ered in the details of his biography (of little interest to Arendt), but how a
person could exercise the power Eichmann did and yet not realize what
he was doing. It is here that bureaucracy emerges as a social structure
that makes possible, facilitates, and perhaps even causes the thoughtless
use of public power. This can occur in two ways. First, through the frag-
mentation and compartmentalization of tasks, bureaucracy insulates those
acting within it from critical educational experiences. Giving the orders
which result in transporting a Jew to a camp in which he might be killed
is far different from arresting the individual, tearing him away from his
home, bringing him to a camp, and clubbing him to death. The bureau-
crat does not have to see or in any direct way experience the full scope of
the organization's activities. Second, bureaucracy tends to diffuse responsi-
bility. No single individual or group of identifiable individuals bears the
full responsibility for the action of the organization. The organization's
35. H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (revised &
enlarged ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as EICHMANN IN JERUSALEi]. Arendt discusses bureaucracy as a
"rule by nobody" in H. ARENDT, On Violence, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 103, 137-38 (1972); H.
ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 40, 44-45 (1958). Other dimensions of bureaucratization are dis-
cussed in H. ARENDT, Lying in Politics, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 1 (1972) and H. ARENDT, THE
ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 375, 398-409 (one vol. ed. 1973).
36. H. ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND 185 (one vol. ed. 1978).
37. EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM, supra note 35, at 287 (emphasis omitted).
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action is the synthetic product of the action of individuals within the or-
ganization (many of whom are not identifiable) and the complicated net-
work of relationships among these individuals, the "structure of the or-
ganization," which combines and refracts individual actions.
The fragmentation and compartmentalization of task that Arendt de-
scribes in the Nazi organization is in fact present in the American judici-
ary, and can insulate the judge from those critical intellectual experiences
that should inform his judgment. To illustrate this danger, consider the
use of the magistrate system to rule on motions to suppress confessions on
the ground that they were coerced (a use which was recently sustained by
the Supreme Court).8 Under this system, it is the magistrate who first
hears the evidence and applies the law. The magistrate announces a "rec-
ommended decision" and then transmits his decision to the judge, who can
decide either to hold a full hearing on the motion or to accept the magis-
trate's decision on the basis of the written transcript. The judge can at
that point listen to the grievance in all its particularity, make a decision,
and then justify that decision; in this way, the judge can use the magis-
trate's inquiry as a supplementary procedure that better enables him to
understand the issues. The issues will be tried twice. There is a great risk,
however, that the judge will not use the magistrate in this way but instead
delegate his decisional power by merely "rubber stamping" the magis-
tate's decision. When this happens, the judge does not genuinely consider
what the privilege against self-incrimination means, either in the particu-
lar case or in general. The magistrate may well have considered what it
means, but this is small consolation. The judge has lost the opportunity
for the understanding and growth-the education-that comes from lis-
tening, deciding, and justifying a decision; and, after all, it is he and not
the magistrate who is entrusted with the judicial power of the United
States. There is also the danger that the uncertain division of decisional
power-an ambiguity in the hierarchical relationship between judge and
magistrate-will skew the magistrate's own decisions. He never fully
knows whether he is responsible for actually deciding the coerced confes-
sion issue or for making a "recommendation" that will in time be fully
scrutinized by a judge.
A case involves a fragmentation of human experience-it has a begin-
ning, middle and end in the way that social life does not. It represents an
artificial and necessarily truncated presentation of a specialized concern.
Contemporary injunctive litigation of the structural variety has vastly ex-
panded the parameters of what has been considered a "case," all to the
good, but limits still exist. I complain of the bureaucratization of the judi-
38. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
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ciary not because it introduces limits where none exist but because it ac-
centuates or aggravates the fragmentation of human experience that is
otherwise endemic to adjudication and the idea of a case. In the example I
discussed, one issue-the coerced confession claim-was taken out of the
case and given to the magistrate to resolve while the judge played an ill-
defined background role. The use of the magistrate insulates the judge
from the presentation of the facts and the law on that particular issue,
thus accentuating the incompleteness of his perspective, and it relieves him
of some of his obligation to explain and justify.
The bureaucratic insularity that I have spoken about in the context of
the magistrate does not arise from the proliferation of judges because that
pathology requires a fragmentation of the judicial task-giving to someone
else part of the job of judging-and neither the duties of a judge nor the
parameters of a case are affected by the number of judges. Even with the
multiplication of judges, each judge remains assigned to a case, and thus
an increase in the total number of judges does not give rise to bureaucratic
insularity. On the other hand, bureaucratic insularity is not confined to
the magistrate system or the particular illustration I used. It arises with
other subjudges as well, for example, a special master who is charged with
the task of formulating and implementing a school desegregation decree. It
also arises with law clerks. They have a role, as Judge Harry Edwards
insists, in the judicial process, just as much as secretaries do. 9 They can
help the judge in many of his endeavors; they can assist in research and,
through argument and criticism, force the judge to re-examine his prem-
ises. To the extent, however, that critical component s of the judicial pro-
cess-I am not referring to the typing-are separated and delegated to
others, so that the person who hears a case is neither the one who studies
the issues, nor the one who decides the case, nor the one who explains or
justifies the result, then the task of judging is fragmented, the judge re-
mains insulated from various components of the process, and the same
thoughtlessness that Arendt found in Eichmann may emerge in judicial
guise.
Of course, the consequences of judicial thoughtlessness are unlikely ever
to be as great or as horrible as those attributable to Eichmann's action-it
is hard to believe anything could. On the other hand, in the judicial con-
text, thoughtlessness is not just a personal failing nor one that might be
evaluated in terms of the consequences it produces. It represents instead a
failure of legitimacy. Thoughtlessness refers to the degeneration of the in-
tellectual process through which a judge comes to know the law and
39. See Edwards, A Judge's View on Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 259, 261-66, 268-69 (1981).
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achieves his moral authority. A judge who exercises power without fully
engaging in the dialogue that is the source of his authority-who leaves it
to others to listen to a grievance or to explain a decision-is like a biolo-
gist who reports an opinion he has not tested by the scientific method. He
may have hit upon the right result, but there is no reason for us to believe
that he is right, or even that he is likely to be so. He has no claim to our
respect. As Chief Justice Hughes insisted, "The one who decides must
hear."4 o
Bureaucratization, as Arendt suggests by her account of Eichmann, not
only produces a dangerous insularity but also dilutes an individual's sense
of responsibility. To the extent that the work of the organization is di-
vided among many people, and is shaped by the organizational structure,
the individual need not accept full responsibility for the decisions or ac-
tions of the organization. With any organization this would be a loss, be-
cause no system of accountability, political or otherwise, will be wholly
effective. We always have to rely on an individual's sense of responsibility.
With the judiciary the loss would be even greater. In part this is due to
the political independence of the judiciary and the fact that a judge's will-
ingness to assume responsibility for his decisions constitutes the primary
check on his power. Even more importantly, a sense of individual respon-
sibility is necessary to animate and motivate the special dialogue that is
the source of judicial authority: It supplies the judge's reason for listening
and explaining. Responsibility is the essential predicate for thought-
fulness.
The proliferation of staff and subjudges and the delegation of power to
them weaken the judge's individual sense of responsibility. The judge acts
on the assumption that his work is the product of "many hands,""' and of
the complicated network of relationships that exists among the individuals
in his organization. The decision or opinion is not wholly his own. The
relatively strong hierarchical relationship between the judge and his sub-
ordinates ensures that the judge assumes some responsibility for their
work-he must answer for his staff-but this hierarchical relationship
does not wholly compensate for the diffusion of responsibility that other-
wise occurs.
For one thing, elements of weakness in the hierarchy remain, and they
attenuate responsibility. The hierarchy is strongest between judge and el-
bow clerk and it can fairly be said that a judge is responsible for his
clerks; on the other hand, the judge does not individually select or super-
vise the staff attorneys. They are not his. They are selected by the chief
40. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936).
41. The phrase is from Thompson, Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of
Many Hands, 74 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 905 (1980).
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judge or some committee of judges, and as implied by the term "central
legal staff," serve no particular judge, but the court as a whole. Similar
distinctions could also be made between different kinds of subjudges. Spe-
cial masters are chosen by the individual judge and work under his direct
supervision. Magistrates, however, are chosen by a majority vote of the
judges of the district court and are supervised by no individual judge. In
the case of staff attorneys and magistrates the individual judge has only a
weak duty of supervision, and he thus feels less responsibility for their
work.
Moreover, the duty of supervision, even when it is very strong, is not a
sufficient substitute for a primary duty like the duty to decide. This can
be seen by assuming first that power is delegated by a judge to a special
master to devise and implement a school desegregation plan, and second
that the special master fails in the discharge of his duty, so that the deseg-
regation plan is a disaster, from either a constitutional or pragmatic per-
spective. The judge bears some responsibility for this disaster; he could be
said to have breached his duty of supervision by placing an inadequate
person in charge or by not looking over the shoulder of the special master
with sufficient care. But these breaches of the duty of supervision seem to
be of a different and lesser order than would be attributed to the judge if
he had formulated and implemented the faulty desegregation plan himself.
The special master clearly bears some burden for failing to discharge the
duty to decide (the primary duty), but he is not the official entrusted with
the judicial power of the United States and he can deflect some responsi-
bility for his failure onto the judge who appointed him, assigned him his
task, and supposedly looked over his shoulder. In short, the breach of the
two duties arising from the division of responsibility within a bureaucratic
organization-a delegated duty to decide subject to supervision and the
duty to supervise-does not equal the breach of a single individual re-
sponsibility within an individualistic framework. One-half plus one-half
does not equal one, especially when the connector-the plus, the hierar-
chy-is weak or ill-defined.
Although I have focused on the relationship between judge and sub-
judge in order to explain why the duty of supervision does not wholly
compensate for the diffusion of responsibility that occurs when the duty of
judging is divided and various components are delegated, I believe that a
similar analysis applies to the relationship between judge and staff. No
matter how strong the hierarchical relationship, whenever the judge uses
staff to discharge his duties he diffuses responsibility. A weak hierarchy
only aggravates the problem. The analysis of the diffusion-of-
responsibility issue in the context of the judge-judge relationship, however,
is more complicated because responsibility among judges is supposed to be
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shared: A judge is not free to shape the law as he believes is right. He is
properly constrained by the interpretations of other judges. He need not
accept full responsibility for his decisions in the way that he must when
we consider his interaction with staff and subjudges. His responsibility is
shared with other judges. This is the necessary implication of stare decisis,
for it entails a sharing of responsibility over time, and it also arises from
the hierarchical relationships that exists between judges on different tiers
on the pyramid. A lower court judge must follow orders from higher
judges and can rightly shift some measure of responsibility to those who
issued the orders. A district judge may believe, for example, that the Con-
stitution prohibits de facto as well as de jure segregation, but he is obliged
by prevailing Supreme Court doctrine to turn his back on a claim attack-
ing de facto segregation alone. His deference is justified by the various
normative and institutional considerations that justify the hierarchical re-
lationship among judges: equal treatment under the law, the aspiration for
a uniform national law, and the role of the Supreme Court in our consti-
tutional scheme.
In the modern world, judging necessarily entails a sharing of the power
and responsibility of decision. The judicial power is exercised through a
multitude of judges. We can acknowledge this fact and still be concerned
about the endless increase in the number of judges because it splinters the
judicial power and tends to reduce the power and responsibility of each
individual judge for the law. Admittedly, we do not want judges to project
their personal predilections; we want them to act as officials, disciplined
by the norms of their office and profession. Yet we insist that each
judge-as an individual and as an official-accept full responsibility for
his decisions by signing his opinion and disclosing his vote. The prolifera-
tion of judges lessens the significance of that act for the individual judge
and creates the need for complex organizational structures (e.g., informa-
tional systems) that inevitably come to shape the course of the law. Re-
sponsibility is shared with the multitude of other judges and with the im-
personal forces and inanimate mechanisms that so pervade complex
organizations. The Rule of Nobody becomes triumphant.
In a bureaucratic world, individual responsibility may give way to cor-
porate responsibility: We may not be able to hold an individual executive
responsible for the action of the organization, but we can hold the corpo-
ration responsible. 42 We may not be able to hold an individual judge re-
42. See C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
58-69 (1975); Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE
L.J. 1 (1980); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227 (1979); Note, Structural Crime and Institu-
tional Rehabilitation, 89 YALE L.J. 353 (1979).
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sponsible for an outcome, but, it might be argued, we can hold the judici-
ary-as a corporate entity-responsible. We can blame mistakes on the
judiciary as a whole, and individual judges would share in that responsi-
bility in some proportion to their role in the organization. Experience
teaches, however, that corporate responsibility is a weak substitute for in-
dividual responsibility. Once individual responsibility is diffusted or
blurred to the degree that Arendt described, an organization can embark
on, or drift into, a course of action that seems to have few limits. In the
case of the judicial bureaucracy, this danger is particularly acute because
the principle of judicial independence, amply protected by Article III,
leaves the people served by the organization with very few means indeed
for holding the corporate entity accountable. The public can do little more
than reverse a particular decision or two, perhaps through a constitutional
amendment, or restrict the jurisdiction of the organization. Such action
might be intended as a repudiation of the organization's decision, but it
scarcely constitutes a vigorous system of accountability and, in any event,
paradoxically places the public in the position of reducing the workload of
the organization while continuing to supply it with the same amount of
resources.
III.
Joseph Vining, in an important article on the subject, ends his analysis
of the bureaucratization of the judiciary with a romantic glance back-
wards. 43 He invites us to rediscover the methods, largely of an individual-
istic character, that make law authoritative. He urges us to give "more
attention to the underpinnings of law" and, on only a slightly more con-
structive note, pleads that we look "anew at the connections and distinc-
tions between lawyers and the practitioners of other disciplines-all disci-
plines, not just the social sciences."14   He believes that the bu-
reaucratization of the judiciary can be reversed. I am less sanguine and,
precisely because I share so many of his aspirations, feel obliged to speak
more specifically about the issue of remedy.
Wade McCree is more specific, but his proposal-to ease the case load
of the courts45-rests on questionable premises. First, the growing case
load has not been the only cause of bureaucratization. The need for more
43. Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REv. 248, 258 (1981).
44. Id.
45. See McCree, Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 793-97
(1981). Two Supreme Court justices also have spoken recently about bureaucratization, linking it to
burgeoning case loads. Rehnquist, Are the True Old Times Dead?, MacSwinford Lecture, University
of Kentucky (Sept. 23, 1982) (on file at the Public Information Office, Supreme Court of the United
States); Powell, Remarks to the American Bar Association, Division of Judicial Administration (Aug.
9, 1982) (on file at the Public Information Office, Supreme Court of the United States).
1459
HeinOnline -- 92 Yale L.J. 1459 1982-1983
The Yale Law Journal
staff, for example, stems not only from the increasing case load, but also
from the increasing volume and complexity of the information to be
processed in contemporary litigation. Recent antitrust cases like the suits
against IBM and AT&T, to take the two most notorious examples, im-
pose far greater informational burdens on the judiciary than did compara-
ble cases at the turn of the century."' Second, increasing case load is itself
the result of broader developments that are not within our power to re-
verse. Judge McCree (in part drawing on the work of Judge Friendly47)
links the increased case load both to judicial innovation, which gives rise
to new claims, and to the failure of the legislature to pass statutes of suffi-
cient specificity. I doubt whether legislative enactments are today any
more general than they were at the turn of the century (witness the Sher-
man Act48); I doubt even more whether fear of increasing the case load is
a legitimate reason for denying a just but novel claim. Yet, even if we put
these doubts to one side and accept Judge McCree's premises, he seems to
have accounted for only a small part of the enormous increase in case
load. The growing case load of the federal judiciary is not a function of
the excessive generality of legislation, nor of excessive judicial innovation,
but stems from the growing size and complexity of American society. The
case load of the federal judiciary would be enormous today even if juris-
diction were cut back to what might be regarded as an irreducible "central
core," for example, to claims arising under federal statutes and the
Constitution. 4
9
Questions of case load should not, of course, be ignored; the burden on
the system should be reduced wherever possible. But it should also be
understood that we will never deal adequately with the problem of
bureaucratization and the threats bureaucratization pose to the integrity of
the judicial process if case load is viewed as the exclusive, or even the
primary, therapeutic target, and other dimensions of the problem are ig-
nored. My suggestion is that we view the issue of bureaucratization from
46. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
47. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973).
48. Oh. 647, 26 Stat. 207 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
49. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 47, at 55. Judge Friendly concludes his effort to pare down the
jurisdiction of the federal courts with a recognition of all that must remain:
We would expect the district courts and the courts of appeals to devote themselves to the
great work for which they are uniquely equipped-assuring protection of rights guaranteed by
the Constitution, enforcing civil rights legislation, dealing with controversies between the citi-
zen and the federal government, applying the federal criminal law, interpreting and applying
acts of Congress that furnish protection, both old and new, to consumers, investors and the
environment, dealing with federal labor and antitrust legislation as well as such traditional
federal specialties as admiralty, bankruptcy and copyright, and controlling the states so that
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another perspective altogether-one that is defined by two premises. The
first denies that adjudication is a discrete aberrational process, an inter-
vention by the state needed now and then to settle a dispute that disrupts
a just and harmonious society. Adjudication should be seen instead, like
the interventions of the executive and legislative branches, as an exercise
of collective power needed on an almost continuous basis to assure that
social life conforms to the public values embodied in the Constitution and
other authoritative legal texts. The need for judicial intervention will al-
ways be great; the case load of the judiciary will constantly grow; and the
claims presented will make enormous informational demands upon the
judges. Second, bureaucratization should not be seen as an isolated phe-
nomenon occurring only in the judiciary. It is present in all forms of pub-
lic authority, precisely because bureaucratization is tied to the increasing
size and complexity of American society. Indeed, an increase in the orga-
nizational capacity of the judiciary (e.g., more judges and staff) may be
preferable to the alternatives-constricting jurisdiction, thereby leaving
claims of justice unanswered, or instituting mass-production techniques
like rulings from the bench and summary dispositions, which threaten the
legitimacy of the judicial power in an even greater way.50
Once the bureaucratization of the judiciary is understood as inevitable,
and to some extent desirable, the organizational needs of the judiciary can
be dealt with more explicitly. The managerial and adjudicatory functions
of judges could be separated, as Judge Rubin has suggested, and new
managerial structures, like a circuit executive, could be created to deal
directly and explicitly with organizational needs.51 Such an arrangement
would reflect the fact that the special processes-dialogue and political
independence-that have traditionally limited the exercise of the judicial
power have no special role to play in resolving managerial questions.
These processes may give judges a special competence to explicate public
50. The number of summary dispositions and bench decisions has grown steadily. See 1982 U.S.
COURTS REPORT, supra note 18, at 83; U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, Annual Report, 1982
(on file with the Clerk of the Sixth Circuit). At the 1982 Second Circuit Judicial Conference, Justice
Marshall pointed to a similar trend on the Supreme Court and condemned the "growing and inexplic-
able readiness on the part of the current Court to dispose of cases summarily." Remarks of Justice
Marshall, Second Circuit Judicial Confrence, at 4 (Sept. 9, 1982) (on file at the Public Information
Office, Supreme Court of the United States). Justices Stevens and Brennan have also criticized this
same trend. Board of Educ. v. McCluskey, 458 U.S. 966, 971-73 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting,
joined by Brennan, J., & Marshall, J.).
51. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency,
55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 648, 654-55 (1980). Richard Hoffman, the chief deputy clerk of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, also emphasizes the need to separate managerial and adjudica-
tory duties, but he reports less-than-satisfactory experiences with the performance of circuit executives
and instead urges an expanded use of circuit councils. Hoffman, The Bureaucratic Spectre: Newest
Challenge to the Courts, 66 JUDICATURE 60, 65-66, 68-69, 72 (1982).
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values, but they do not help in managing a complex organization and, in
that domain, may in fact prove counterproductive.
Even more important, separating the legal and managerial duties of the
judge's job will strengthen that fragile institution of judicial accountabil-
ity-public criticism. Judges will remain responsible for both their legal
and managerial judgments, but, once separated, each type of judgment
will have to stand on its own. Each will have to meet a separate and
distinct set of criteria. When these judgments are blended together in some
indeterminate proportions, however, as they might have been in the
Reynolds v. Sims5 2 one person, one vote formula or in many of the doc-
trines fashioned by Justice Rehnquist to establish control over the lower
courts,'53 those seeking to evaluate a judicial decision never know whether
the proper standard is managerial or legal (but only that the managerial
is becoming increasingly important). The problem is the one of the con-
stantly moving target. Criticism will always be slightly inapposite and the
prospect of an abuse of the judicial power that much more real.
Recognizing bureaucratization as an inevitable and, to some degree, de-
sirable feature of the modern judiciary will also enable us to deal more
effectively with the two bureaucratic dysfunctions-insulation from criti-
cal educational experiences and diffusion of responsibility-that threaten
the moral foundations of the judicial power. It will lead to a remedial
strategy that focuses on organizational design.54 The issue is not whether
we can eliminate bureaucratization altogether, but whether we can con-
tain the dysfunctions or pathologies of bureaucratization, and certain or-
ganizational changes may help in that regard. These changes will not, to
be sure, dismantle the judicial bureaucracy, for that is not our purpose
nor is it even possible, but they may curb the dysfunctions and thereby
preserve the integrity of the judicial process.
In order to expose judges first-hand to the underlying facts of a case
52. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). According to John Ely, the Court found itself with no alternative to the
one person, one vote standard "precisely because of considerations of administrability." J. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST 124 (1980) (emphasis omitted). He was speaking about the difficulties a
court might have applying a more nuanced standard in some particular case, but the point carries over
to the difficulties one court might encounter in supervising the application of such a standard by
another court. See also Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 247 (1968); Irwin, Representation and
Election: The Reapportionment Cases in Retrospect, 67 MICH. L. REV. 729, 748-49 (1969).
53. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 542 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 489, 519-24 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 418-21 (1977); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
373-81 (1976). For a discussion of the problem of control by appellate courts over "disobedient"
judges in another era, see Note, Judicial Performance in the Fifth Circuit, 73 YALE L.J. 90 (1963)
(discussing recalcitrance of Southern district judges in civil rights cases); see also J. BASS, UNLIKELY
HEROES (1981) (role of Fifth Circuit in desegregation cases).
54. See generally 0. WILLLAISON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHY 132-54 (1971) (suggesting that
alteration of organizational form of corporations can minimize dysfunctions).
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and to ensure that judges are responsible for their decisions, an effort
should be made to reduce the frequency with which judges appoint special
masters. They have been appointed most frequently in cases seeking the
structural reform of large-scale organizations, such as schools, prisons, or
institutions for the mentally retarded, because of the special need those
cases create in terms of social knowledge and representational structure.
These cases are critical to a proper discharge of the judicial function and
special masters can help to meet their special needs. But these needs can
be met through alternative organizational forms, such as expert witnesses
or amici, which do not involve a fragmentation and delegation of the judi-
cial task and thus do not create the bureaucratic dysfunctions that arise
from the use of special masters. The judge should therefore be pressed to
explore alternative means of meeting the special needs of structural litiga-
tion before appointing a special master.55 The appointment of a special
master should be an option of last resort.56
When it is the judge who creates a subjudge like a special master there
is special reason to be wary because the judge has incentives to do it for
the wrong reasons-to shield himself from responsibility or to relieve him-
self from the drudgery that sometimes comes from total immersion in the
particulars of a complex case. Thus, judicially created subjudges should be
especially disfavored. But there are also reasons to be wary when the leg-
islature creates subjudges, as it did with the magistrates.57 The legislative
creation of subjudges burdens judges with the duties of appointing, super-
vising, and deciding to retain the subjudges, thereby adding to their mana-
gerial tasks. It also brings into being a group of officials who tend to
insulate judges from critical educational experiences and diffuse their re-
sponsibility. On this score, there is no difference between magistrates and
special masters. This is not to deny the need that might have led Congress
to the magistrate system in 1968-the rising case load-but only to sug-
gest that there are good and important reasons for exploring alternative
organizational forms for meeting these same needs.
One alternative is simply to create more district and circuit judgeships.
In contrast to the proliferation of subjudges, increasing the number of
judges does not create the bureaucratic pathology linked to the fragmenta-
55. Some have suggested that the role of special masters could be performed by United States
trustees who would be located in the executive, or more particularly in the Department of Justice. See
Hoffman, supra note 51, at 71. There is an irony to this suggestion, since the institution of the special
master arose in response to the withdrawal of the Department of Justice from structural litigation in
the late 1960's. See Aronow, supra note 15, at 746-47.
56. This may already be the established rule. See La Buy v. Home Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249,
256-57 (1957).
57. See Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carcinoma of the Federal Judiciary, 31 ALA. L. REV.
261, 265-66 (1980).
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tion and compartmentalization of task-insulating the judge from critical
educational experiences. An increase in the total number of judges does
not make any single judge more insulated. It may, I admit, dilute judicial
responsibility, because any increase in the number of judges will weaken
each judge's sense of individual responsibility and create the need for new
organizational structures (e.g., informational systems) to minimize the risk
of inconsistent and unequal adjudication. But responsibility will be dif-
fused-perhaps to an even greater degree-when subjudges are used to
meet the need for more personnel, for subjudges multiply the number of
decisionmakers and create the need for coordinating structures, and the
subjudge alternative poses the additional dangers associated with bureau-
cratic insularity.
Subjudges might be cheaper than an increase in the number of judges
and might seem to some less threatening to the elite status of the federal
judge. I, however, doubt that the savings would be decisive and that the
special status of the federal judiciary in any important sense depends on
the number of judges in the system. It depends on their role in the politi-
cal and social system. Justice Rehnquist, arguing the contrary, imagined
an increase in the number of the district judges in Kentucky from nine to
forty-one by the year 2027 and then asked: "Could anyone seriously
maintain that the judicial 'coin' would not [be] somewhat debased by this
great increase in its numbers?"58 I could (depending on what he meant by
"somewhat"). But even if I am wrong, and these relatively small changes
in number are decisive, the fact of the matter is that the "coin" might
have to be "debased" in order to avoid the bureaucratic pathologies-and
maybe even constitutional objections-associated with meeting the contem-
porary need for adjudicatory personnel through the use of subjudges.
A second alternative to the use of subjudges is for Congress to create
specialized tribunals that would stand outside the bureaucratic pyramid of
the general federal system. The tax court and the court of military appeals
are examples of what I have in mind. We may as a result end up with
two or more smaller bureaucracies in the place of one mammoth bureau-
cracy, and lines of review would have to be created to the Supreme Court,
but in terms of the integrity of the judicial process, more but smaller bu-
58. Rehnquist, supra note 45, at 15-16. Judge Posner recommends freezing the number of district
court judges as a means of containing appellate case loads and thereby avoiding an increase in the
number of appellate court judges. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An
Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 763-67
(1983). He too seems to believe that maintaining the special status of federal (appellate) judges is
critically linked to limiting their number. Later in the same article, he suggests that increasing the
number of federal appellate judges may be a "positive step" since it would reduce the concentration of
federal power. Id. at 790.
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reaucracies would be a gain. The larger the bureaucracy, the greater the
diffusion of responsibility.
In the past, the creation of specialized tribunals has encountered two
types of problems. One stems from the reluctance of Congress to endow
specialized judges with Article III attributes-life tenure and protection
against pay reduction. Indeed, only recently the Supreme Court struck
down the bankruptcy court system for this very reason, and Congress ap-
pears to be responding to that decision with great reluctance.59 In part the
problem is transitional: In refusing to confer on the bankruptcy judges the
protection of Article III, Congress is expressing a measure of unease with
those who now happen to hold office and who would be elevated to judi-
cial status under the reform. But as a wholly prospective matter, the con-
gressional reluctance is hard to fathom. The most minimal regard for con-
stitutional values and for the avoidance of needless conflict among the
branches (Ashwander60 transposed to the legislative process) should lead
Congress to give the judges of whatever specialized courts it decides to
create the independence that comes from life tenure and protection against
reduction of salary. Independence is something that rightly belongs to any
judge. Of course, the Article III formula is not the only way to ensure
judicial independence, as is evident from the practices of various states,
but it is difficult to identify any substantial interests that would be fur-
thered by avoiding the dictates of Article III.
The dissenters in the recent bankruptcy case spoke of a need to preserve
the "future options" of Congress in the face of a possible decline in the
number of bankruptcy cases,61 but this concern for budgetary flexibility
seems, at least to me, a rather trivial reason for withholding Article III
protection and for "experimenting" with other means of guaranteeing in-
dependence. To consider another reason sometimes offered for avoiding
the dictates of Article III, namely, preserving the status of federal judges,
let me say that although explicitly conferring Article III protections on
specialized judges-who as a practical matter probably enjoy life tenure
and whose pay is unlikely to be reduced-might enhance their status, it is
difficult to see how this small increment of status would adversely affect
the status of the federal district and circuit judges who would retain their
more general jurisdiction.62 Status derives from function, and the function
59. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); see supra
note 25 (discussing congressional reaction to decision).
60. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341, 345-48, 355-56 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
61. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 118 (White, J., dissenting).
62. For a pointed suggestion of techniques available to Congress for preserving the special status
of general federal judges against the specialist, without compromising the values of Article III, see
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 74 n.28.
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of the specialized judge must be secondary to that of the generalist who
under our system will invariably be charged with enforcing the highest
law.
Establishing specialized courts also raises questions about the value of a
general, non-specialized perspective on legal issues.6" There is an undeni-
able freshness and richness to the judgments of a non-specialist. There is
also less chance of capture by a special interest group. I would not, there-
fore, establish a separate, specialized tribunal to deal with school desegre-
gation, to mention one example, but rather would confine this strategy to
areas where there is less value to the generalist's insight and less danger of
capture. Tax and bankruptcy are perfect examples; admiralty may be an-
other; so may patents (part of the jurisdiction of the new Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit). 4 The standard should be, to borrow Justice
White's phrase in the recent bankruptcy case, "extreme specialization."6 5
We should realize, moreover, that we are considering the prospect of cre-
ating specialized tribunals under two very special assumptions-first, that
we are unwilling to deal with the increased case load by the creation of
new judges of general jurisdiction; and second, that we are comparing the
specialized tribunal with the alternative of creating more subjudges, whose
jurisdiction also tends to be specialized. Under these assumptions, the task
is not to choose between the generalist and the specialist, but how to or-
ganize specialists. The issue is one of organizational form-whether we
are, for example, to have bankruptcy referees or a bankruptcy court. Sub-
judges are specialists with considerable power (though perhaps a little less
than a specialized tribunal would have). They would, in contrast to the
specialized judges, also compound the managerial duties of the general
judge, insulate those who decide from those who hear, and diffuse respon-
sibility for decisions.
A remedial strategy that emphasizes alternative organizational forms
also has implications for the use of staff. I start with the proposition that
staff is indispensable to assist the judge in modern litigation-as indispen-
63. The arguments against specialized appellate courts are advanced by Judge Posner, supra note
58, at 775-91. He thinks even patent litigation is an inappropriate subject matter for a specialized
tribunal because of its ideological content. Id. at 780-83. For a survey of the judicial specialization
debate and a more receptive attitude toward specialized tribunals, see Jordan, Should Litigants Have
a Choice Between Specialized Courts and Courts of General Jurisdiction?, 66 JUDICATURE 14 (1982);
Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U.L. REV. 745 (1981).
64. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, § 101, 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1982). The jurisdiction of
this new court may grow over time, as a way of dealing with various managerial problems within the
federal system. Chief Justice Burger's most recent plan to ease the workload of the Supreme Court
contemplates using panels of judges from this new court "to decide all intercircuit conflicts and possi-
bly, in addition, a defined category of statutory interpretation cases." Remarks of Chief Justice Bur-
ger, Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Association 11 (Feb. 6, 1983) (on file at Office of Public
Information, Supreme Court of the United States).
65. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 118 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
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sable as it is for the modem trial lawyer to be helped by a staff of young
associates and paraprofessionals. It is possible, however, to organize the
judicial staff in a way that minimizes bureaucratic pathologies. In the case
of elbow clerks, who work under the immediate and direct supervision of
a particular judge, the optimum organizational arrangement can be insti-
tuted by the judge himself. He simply should keep the clerk at his el-
bow-he should not delegate any critical component of the decisional pro-
cess to the clerk and he should maintain strong supervision over whatever
work the clerk is allowed to do. The judge will thereby avoid insulating
himself from critical educational experiences and minimize the diffusion
of responsibility that inevitably comes from the proliferation of staff. The
judge should know that he will be held fully responsible for the work,
style, and errors of his elbow clerks, and should organize his staff
accordingly.
With respect to the staff attorney, however, we must consider a more
radical and more formal change-abolishing the position altogether. This
proposal stems from my belief that staff attorneys pose too great a risk of
diffusing responsibility, precisely because they are responsible to no par-
ticular judge but only to the court in general. Staff attorneys usually work
under the loose supervision of several judges, but their work is never im-
puted to any particular judge. They remain faceless, as does much of their
work. Indeed, accompanying the advent of the staff attorney is the
proliferation of anonymous edicts-the "judgment order" and the "per
curiam"-which, oddly enough, are sometimes used to dispose of difficult
and far-reaching questions. 68 The use of staff attorneys to screen so-called
"meritless" cases not only produces an anonymous form of justice, but
tends to insulate judges from the ebb and flow of the law and the full
impact of the grievances presented. Judges may need more staff in order
to work through their increasing case load and to help in more complex
cases, but their staff should be organized in a way that reinforces rather
than diminishes the judge's sense of responsibility, and that increases
rather than reduces his participation in the dialogue that is the source of
his authority.
These suggestions-curbing the use of special masters and other sub-
judges such as magistrates, strengthening the supervision of elbow clerks,
and eliminating staff attorneys altogether-are not meant to be exhaus-
66. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbard, 686 F.2d 955 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (ordering no
disclosure of Church of Scientology documents); United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (per curiam) (ruling on suppression motions in trial of person charged with attempt to assassi-
nate President). A similar use of the anonymous edict appears on the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (per curiam) (summary affirmance of provisions of
AT&T antitrust decree); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975) (per curiam) (invalidating portions of
federal campaign finance statute).
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tive. They are meant only to indicate the range of alternatives possible
within a remedial strategy that seeks to end the obsession with case load
and to invite attention to issues of organizational form. They are intended
only to render that remedial strategy credible; the list of particular sugges-
tions can and must be continued. I must admit, however, that even when
that list is continued, we will be left with a judiciary that is bureaucra-
tized-a highly complex organization that is characterized by a number of
hierarchical relationships and that tends to insulate judges from critical
educational experiences and to diffuse responsibility. This seems to me to
be part of the modern predicament. The world changes-we move from a
society of individuals to a society of organizations-and yet we find we
must live and work with forms of authority that presuppose a world that
no longer exists and that is beyond our power to recall.
The response to this predicament should not be resignation or despair.
It would be a mistake to conclude from this analysis that we should re-
nounce the judicial power, as though we have some other way of protect-
ing our public values and checking the political branches of the activist
state. There are instead two other possibilities. One is to reexamine our
individualistic ideals and the forms of authority to which they give rise;
maybe, as Bruce Ackerman suggested at a carefree luncheon, when I was
about to begin this paper, bureaucracies can engage in dialogue. The
other and, to my mind, more realistic alternative is to search for those
small incremental changes in institutional design that may enable us to
realize more fully our individualistic ideals within a world of a wholly
different character.
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